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POLICING THE POLICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1950s, the need for an effective system for dealing with complaints 
against the police has been a “live issue” in the UK (Maguire 1991: 177). Unlike 
some countries, where responsibility for dealing with complaints against the police 
rests with the national ombudsman as part of the general remit over the way public 
bodies deal with citizens, the police in the UK are not within the remit of the 
Parliamentary or local authority ombudsmen.  In the UK, the mechanisms that exist 
for dealing with police complaints have grown up independently of the ombudsmen 
systems established for other public sector services. Moreover, these specialised 
mechanisms do not conform to one single model, with the result that the police 
complaints systems in England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have 
different features and different levels of external oversight. 
   In all three jurisdictions, recent years have seen a period of change. A new system 
for police complaints has recently been initiated in England and Wales, with the 
introduction of the Independent Police Complaints Commission in April 2004; 
Northern Ireland’s Police Ombudsman, introduced in October 2000, is establishing 
itself as a high profile and effective office; and Scotland is in the process of 
considering proposals to change its system for investigating complaints against the 
police. It is within this context that this paper examines various models for police 
complaints systems, and reviews the three systems for dealing with complaints against 
the police within the UK.  
 
POLICE COMPLAINTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
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In some ways complaints against the police are no different from other complaints by 
consumers of public services. Complaints are unresolved problems where redress is 
needed, and effective mechanisms for dealing with them are an essential aspect of the 
accountability of that service. However, accountability mechanisms have an added 
dimension for the police service, as the police are in a very different position to other 
providers of public services. They are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, 
and this role means that they have a range of powers and equipment to enable them to 
carry out their law enforcement function. For example, they have powers of arrest, 
they can deprive citizens of their liberty, and they can question and detain. They can 
impose upon personal and community freedom in a way that no other body of persons 
can. They have considerable coercive powers, and the way they exercise those powers 
involves a significant amount of discretion. 
   Police misconduct thus presents a particular threat to the rights and liberties of 
individual citizens. Moreover, it can also undermine the credibility of the criminal 
justice system, the effectiveness of policing, and the legitimacy of government (see 
Bayley 1995: 93). Tackling police misconduct is difficult because of the 
organisational culture of policing, where group loyalty militates against officers 
testifying against each other. Pressures on the police to secure convictions, 
particularly in high profile cases, also leads to ‘noble cause’ corruption, where police 
officers, convinced of the guilt of suspects, “routinely” deviate from rules and 
regulations in order to secure convictions (Punch 2003: 187). 
   As a result of this, it is of major importance that there is some external control over 
police powers, and adequate systems of accountability. 
 
Accountability Mechanisms 
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Within the UK, there is a tripartite system of control for the police: central 
government, local government and the police organisation itself. Central government 
control is exercised by ministers; local control is the function of police authorities, 
and the police side of the tripartite structure is exercised by the chief constable, 
pursuant to the concept of constabulary independence. 
   Like any citizen, individual police officers are subject to the criminal law, and can, 
of course, be prosecuted for crimes they may commit in the course of carrying out 
their duties. In all three jurisdictions, the function of prosecution of police officers 
remains with the public prosecutor’s department, and is thus outside of the police 
organisation. There is, of course, a structural relationship between the police and the 
prosecuting authorities, and this “may give the impression, whatever the reality, of 
collusion” (Harrison and Cragg 1995: 113), and concerns have been expressed in 
England and Wales as to whether there are problems in relation to impartiality where 
a police officer is prosecuted (see Cunneen and Harrison 2001). 
 
Civil litigation 
As with other public services, individual citizens can pursue civil cases for damages 
where torts are committed by the police, for example for personal injury caused by a 
police officer. There is little statistical detail about this, but the evidence suggests that 
in England and Wales during the last quarter of a century there has been a significant 
increase in the number of actions for damages against the police (Smith 2003: 413; 
McLaughlin and Johansen 2002: 642). Published figures reveal that in 1998/99 there 
were 5961 civil claims and settlement awards totaling £4.61 million (HMIC 1999). In 
the following year, there were 5357 claims, and £6,898 million paid out (HMIC 
2000).  However, the figures are erratic, and it has been noted that there is a “dearth of 
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quantitative data on police action” and a “paucity of qualitative research” (Smith 
2003: 413).  
   Research that has been conducted has noted that the motive in suing the police is not 
chiefly financial, “but to bring facts to light, or to bring the police to book” (Ward 
2002: 21). While financial compensation clearly plays a major role in offsetting 
claimants’ frustration, the non-pecuniary aspects of civil procedure are also important. 
These include the openness of the procedure; the independence of the adjudication; 
the public vindication if successful; and the fact that claimants can proceed with a 
considerable degree of equality with the defendant (Smith 2003: 421). Even if 
damages are not awarded, claimants have the satisfaction of hearing police officers 
account for their conduct in court. This contrasts with police complaints systems 
where complainants neither hear officers answer for their conduct nor discover the 
action taken when misconduct is found (Smith 2004: 23). 
    Given that the chances of success in the civil courts in actions for damages are 
“dramatically higher” than pursuing a remedy through the complaints or criminal 
process (Ward 2002: 21), it is not surprising that many complainants do not bother 
with the formal complaints system, but turn instead to civil action (Smith 2004: 23; 
Reid 2002: 194). Litigation is proving a more effective way of achieving vindication 
for victims of police misconduct than complaints procedures. Moreover, civil actions 
can attract publicity and thus stimulate debate about police misconduct (Harrison and 
Cragg 1995: 9).  
 
Complaints procedures 
In addition to external remedies, individual police officers, like any other public 
servants, must be institutionally accountable for the way they do their job. 
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Accountability is an essential prerequisite of public confidence in the police service, 
because, as already noted, police misconduct, if unfettered, can threaten the credibility 
of the criminal justice system and the effectiveness of the police. Confidence in the 
police is essential in a democratic society. A complaints process for police 
misconduct must therefore command the confidence of the public, in order to achieve 
public support for the police (see Goldsmith and Lewis 2000; Smith 2001). On the 
other hand, a negative experience with the police complaints system can have a wider 
negative effect on confidence in the whole police organisation since public perception 
of the effectiveness of the complaints system is an important component of the 
process of accountability (Strudwick 2003: 36). Police complaints systems have been 
described as one of the three pillars of accountability (Police Monitoring and 
Research Group 1987: 6), the other two being accountability to the law, and to the 
police authority. Thus, police complaints mechanisms are an important part of the 
process of democratic policing. 
   Complaints procedures are not the only means of formally addressing the issue of 
police accountability of course. As already noted, other accountability mechanisms 
include the traditional tripartite control structure, internal audit procedures, and the 
external Inspectorates, which together present a formidable level of scrutiny. 
However, it can be argued that it is complaints procedures which represent the  “pre-
eminent” mechanism for citizens to comment on a variety of police practices directly 
affecting their lives, providing a “grassroots” method and a “structured opportunity” 
for doing so (Goldsmith 1995: 110-111).  
 
MODELS OF POLICE COMPLAINTS SYSTEMS 
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Internationally there are a number of models for police complaints systems. At one 
end of the spectrum, there is complete self-regulation, with the police conducting and 
regulating investigation into complaints, without any external oversight or input. At 
the opposite extreme, complaints against the police can be dealt with by a body 
entirely independent of the police, where the body has complete responsibility for the 
investigation of all complaints against the police. Within these two extremes, there is 
range of systems with varying degrees of internal and external investigation and 
different levels of civilian oversight, supervision and audit of the complaint handling 
function. Complaints bodies may be concerned with investigating the particulars of 
the incident complained about, or be limited to an investigation of the procedures 
involved in handling the complaint. 
   A complaints system may also have a number of functions, including maintaining 
internal discipline and providing information to management with which to make 
improvements, as well as satisfying complainants and gaining public confidence 
(Maguire and Corbett 1991). However, while the relationship between complaints and 
discipline is important, the complaint system should not simply serve as a preliminary 
stage for criminal or disciplinary proceeding for police officers, as this makes the 
complaint process “a poor relation of the discipline process” (Smith 2000: 4). On the 
contrary, it may be that  “satisfying the complainant should be a prioritised objective 
of any police force” (Waters and Brown 2000:635). Thus, an effective complaints 
system must have adequate remedies, including making wrongdoers accountable for 
their behaviour, encouraging them to repair the harm they have caused, and satisfying 
the complainant that their case has been appropriately handled. 
   Prenzler and Ronken (2001), in their theoretical paper on the best form of control of 
police conduct, identify three models for police complaints systems: internal, civilian 
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control and civilian review. Where complaints are dealt with internally, the only 
oversight provided is by the courts, in cases where police officers are prosecuted, and 
elected officials, in the form of police authorities. The internal model has received 
such “an extensive critique”, largely because of the “apparent pathological inability of 
police to objectively investigate their peers” (p. 157), that it is no longer seen as 
appropriate or acceptable. Thus, the only real issue to be addressed is what kind of 
civilian oversight model to adopt. 
   “Civilian review” involves an independent audit of internal investigations and 
disciplinary decisions. Within such a model, the police normally conduct 
investigations into complaints and determine what disciplinary actions should follow. 
The role of the external agency is to monitor the process. Noting that this is very 
much a compromise model, Prenzler and Ronken argue for the adoption of the 
civilian control model for police complaints, where there is genuinely independent 
investigation and adjudication of complaints (p. 166). In support of their argument, 
they draw on Scarman (1986: 182-183), who noted that “so long as the investigation 
of complaints remains in police hands”, there would continue to be criticisms of the 
system, and that only “the establishment of an independent service for the 
investigation of all complaints against the police” would silence this criticism. 
   The civilian control model need not weaken police responsibility for maintaining 
discipline, as police managers could still exercise their role in internal disciplinary 
matters (Prenzler and Ronken 2001: 169), and the police could also have prime 
responsibility for the mediation of complaints (p. 166). Nor do Prenzler and Ronken 
accept that it is only police officers who have the necessary competence in 
investigation skills and the capacity to penetrate the police world. Investigation is a 
generic skill that can be taught and developed in diverse contexts and penetration of 
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the police world can be achieved by structural reform, including whistleblower 
protection legislation, mandatory reporting of misconduct and surveillance technology 
(p.168).  
   The advantage of the civilian control model is its independence, which is one of the 
most important features required in any system for investigating complaints if it is to 
inspire public confidence. The public has a deep suspicion of the way complaints 
against the police are handled, and thus complaints systems must not only be 
independent, but must also be perceived as such. In order for this to occur, there must 
be a “clear institutional separation of the person being investigated from the person 
doing the investigation” (Prenzler and Ronken 2001: 168).    
 
ENGLAND AND WALES: THE INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS 
COMMISSION 
In England and Wales, the system for dealing with police complaints has traditionally 
followed the civilian review model. A new system has recently started, with the 
establishment of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) in April 
2004. Given that reform of police complaints procedures “is almost always preceded 
by some observable ‘crisis’ of public legitimacy in the police” (Goldsmith 1988: 60), 
the context of police complaints in England and Wales will be summarised, before 
evaluating the new system. 
 
Context   
Before the 1960s, police forces dealt with complaints internally. However, these 
internal investigations were mistrusted (Lewis 1999: 29-30), and in 1962 a Royal 
Commission questioned whether the police should be responsible for investigating 
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complaints against their colleagues (Royal Commission on the Police 1962). This 
resulted in a provision in the Police Act 1964, to allow for the investigation of 
complaints by a senior officer from a different police force. This system too was 
subjected to much criticism (Jones 1969; Justice 1970: 4-5, 7), and it was replaced by 
the Police Complaints Board, established by the Police Act 1976, which was the first 
attempt at introducing civilian oversight of police complaints. The police continued to 
investigate complaints as before, but the Board had limited powers of review of the 
process. Not surprisingly, this proved to be ineffective, and the public had little 
confidence in its ability to perform an oversight function (Lewis 1999: 66). 
   This loss of confidence was partly a result of greater social awareness during the 
1970s and 1980s about the injustices perpetrated upon minority groups by the state in 
general and the police in particular (Lewis 1999: 54). The Brixton riots in 1981, and 
the subsequent inquiry into them by Lord Scarman (1981) eventually led to the 
Board’s demise. The inquiry report recommended radical reform of the system, in 
order to restore public confidence in it. Two models were proposed. The first involved 
independent investigation for all complaints against the police. The second provided 
for lay supervision for serious complaints. It was the latter model that was adopted for 
the Police Complaints Authority, which replaced the Police Complaints Board in 
1984.  
   Although undoubtedly an improvement on its predecessor, the Police Complaints 
Authority was also subject to criticism,1 and suggestions were made for reform of the 
system from a number of quarters: the Police Complaints Authority itself,2 Liberty 
(Harrison and Cunneen 2000) and the Macpherson Report (1999). The Macpherson 
report in particular, which investigated the conduct of the police in relation to the 
                                                          
1 See “Foreword” by the Chair in PCA 2000. See also KPMG (2000). 
2 See Home Affairs Select Committee 1998. 
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death of Stephen Lawrence, was very critical of the Police Complaints Authority’s 
reliance on police investigators, noting that the investigation of police officers by their 
own or another police service “is widely regarded as unjust, and does not inspire 
confidence” (Macpherson 1999: 333). Thus, by the end of the 1990s, “after a series of 
scandals and mounting public criticism” it was clear that the police complaints system 
was ready for fundamental reform (McLaughlin and Johansen 2002: 651). 
 
The Independent Police Complaints Commission 
The new system for dealing with complaints against the police in England and Wales, 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), was introduced on 1 April 
2004, as a result of the Police Reform Act 2002. It is bases on proposals (see Home 
Office 2000), published after the Home Office appointed management consultants to 
examine the process of investigation into police complaints (KPMG 2000). The IPCC 
is a non-departmental government body, consisting of a chair and commissioners, 
who form its governing body and set its policy. The chair is appointed by the Queen, 
for five years, with the possibility of re-appointment for a second term. The 
commissioners are appointed by the Home Secretary for a five year term.  
   The IPCC’s role is to ensure that its arrangements for handling complaints are 
efficient, effective, and “contain and manifest an appropriate degree of 
independence”, and to establish and maintain public confidence in the system (Police 
Reform Act 2002, section 10). Its remit is to investigate complaints and conduct 
matters in relation to police officers, police civilian staff and special constables. It 
cannot investigate complaints in relation to the direction and control of the police 
service and force policy.  
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   The IPCC has four procedures available to it for dealing with complaints: 
investigation by the police; investigation by the police supervised by the IPCC; 
investigation by the police managed by the IPCC; investigation by the IPCC. The first 
two procedures are no different to those previously operated by the Police Complaints 
Authority. “Managed” investigations, a new procedure, is similar to supervised 
investigations, but with more direct control by the IPCC, involving day-to-day 
direction and control of the officers appointed to investigate. “Independent” 
investigation is the other new process. Unlike the Police Complaints Authority, the 
IPCC will be able to employ its own investigators in order to conduct independent 
investigation of complaints. These investigators will have the same powers of seizure 
and questionning as the police in order to conduct the investigation. 
   Police forces have a duty to co-operate with the IPCC’s investigation, and have an 
obligation to provide access to documentation and other material and access to police 
premises. Chief police officers are responsible for obtaining and preserving evidence 
in cases involving officers under their direction and control. In addition to the powers 
available for conducting investigations, the IPCC also has powers to access police 
records, premises and documents in order to examine the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the arrangements for handling complaints within the police force. 
   The remedies available to the IPCC after an investigation has been conducted 
include directing the disclosure of specific information and re-investigation, and 
making recommendations and issuing directions on disciplinary action. Where the 
IPCC directs a police force to bring disciplinary charges, it can present cases against 
police officers at misconduct hearings. The police have a duty to comply with the 
recommendations and directions. The IPCC has no power to prosecute officers where 
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there is evidence of criminal conduct, that function remaining with the Crown 
Prosecution Service. 
   Complaints can be made by the direct victims of the relevant conduct, those 
adversely affected by it, witnesses to it, or those acting on behalf of someone in these 
categories. The police retain the primary responsibility for recording complaints under 
the new system, although this can be regulated by the IPCC, which can give guidance 
on the procedures to be followed (Ormerod and Roberts 2003: 150). Unlike the 
previous system, reasons must be given if the police refuse to record a complaint, and 
the complainant has a right of appeal to the IPCC if the complaint is not recorded. The 
police must record conduct matters which have resulted in death or serious injury, and 
there is provision in the legislation for the Secretary of State to make regulations 
specifying other areas where there is to be mandatory recording. Cases where civil 
proceedings appear to disclose a conduct matter must also be recorded. The police 
must refer death or serious injury matters to the IPCC,3 and can voluntarily refer other 
complaints. In addition, the IPCC can require a complaint to be referred to it.  
   There is also provision for complaints to be resolved informally by the police, 
which will be known as “local resolution”. This can be used with complainant’s 
written consent, and where the conduct, if proved, would not justify bringing criminal 
or disciplinary proceedings. It can also be used, with the IPCC’s approval, where it 
would not be practicable to bring criminal proceedings which would be likely to result 
in a conviction, or disciplinary proceedings that would lead to serious penalties. 
Importantly, the use of local resolution procedures will be monitored by the IPCC. 
 
Evaluation 
                                                          
3 They will also have to refer those matters specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. 
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It is too early to evaluate the operation of the new system, but there are a number of 
problems with the model adopted, particularly in relation to its independence and the 
ability of the IPCC to exercise control of the process. The major criticism of the 
previous system was its lack of independence. Although the Police Complaints 
Authority was in fact independent of the police, the complaints system as a whole did 
not possess sufficient actual4 and perceived5 independence. It is reasonably clear that 
only a system which is wholly independent of the police service, the civilian control 
model (Prenzler and Ronken 2001), can secure the confidence, not only of the public, 
but also the rank and file of police (Reiner 1992: 236; Waters and Brown 2000: 633; 
Police Federation 1997; KPMG 2000: 42).  
   The new system, with a new name designed to reinforce its independence from the 
police, does not appear to be so sufficiently different from its predecessor to be 
convincing as a wholly independent system. Although there is the possibility of a 
body independent of the police conducting its own investigations into police conduct, 
there is no statutory requirement to do so. The IPCC will be limited by its resources in 
the number of investigations it carries out, resulting in few complaints being 
independently investigated,6 with the vast majority of investigations continuing to be 
investigated by the police.  Thus, if most investigations are, by force of 
circumstances, conducted internally, the new powers could prove to be “illusory and 
ineffective” (Cunneen and Harrison 2001: 8), with the system substantially replicating 
its predecessor, and thus unlikely to satisfy its “most ardent critics” (Ormerod and 
Roberts 2003: 147). 
                                                          
4 The European Court of Human Rights found that the police complaints process did not meet the 
requisite standards of independence to constitute sufficient protection against the abuse of authority 
(Sultan Khan v UK  (2001) 31 EHRR 45; (2000) 8 BHRC; [2000] CrimLR 684). 
5 Empirical research conducted in 1996-97 on behalf of the police in England and Wales noted a 
perceived lack of objectivity and independence and concern about the police investigating themselves 
(Waters and Brown 2000; Strudwick 2003: 35). 
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   There is also a problem with the Home Secretary’s dual policing and complaints 
responsibilities, which may compromise the independence of the IPCC (Smith 2002). 
The fact that the Home Secretary has control of the appointment and dismissal of the 
commissioners, has led to the suggestion that the IPCC may be little more than “the 
latest Home Office controlled ‘puppet on a string’” (McLaughlin and Johansen 2002: 
635). 
   Thirdly, although there is provision for complaints to be made directly to the IPCC, 
access to the system will still largely be in the control of the police. This is a far cry 
from the civilian control model outlined by Prenzler and Ronken (2001: 172), which 
involves a complaint being initially assessed by an external agency, to identify 
whether there should be an investigation, mediation, or referral to another agency. 
The police are very much in charge of the process, with duties to keep complainants 
informed of the progress and outcome of the investigation.  
   The enhanced role of informal resolution could also be problematic. This is now 
known as “local resolution”, a change that emphasises that it is an official procedure 
(Reid 2002: 191) for resolving minor complaints. The intention of local resolution is 
to create a climate of conciliation (Zander 2002), to address poor performance 
(McLaughlin and Johansen 2002: 641), and to bring to police complaints the benefits 
of restorative justice.7 Such an approach may make police officers more accountable 
for their actions, in so far as they will have to accept responsibility in relation to the 
victim, and it may help to maintain public confidence by providing a pragmatic 
response to complaints that would be unlikely to succeed in formal proceedings (see 
Ormerod and Roberts 2003: 152). However, there is a danger that it may be perceived 
as “less procedurally legitimate and less just than formal investigation”, particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 KPMG (2000: 50) envisaged only about 1000 cases being independently investigated. 
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for “disenfranchised communities and discriminated against social groups” 
(McLaughlin and Johansen 2002: 651). Its very informality could lead to mistrust of 
what might be perceived as an internal system that fails to treat complaints seriously. 
   Another area that may prove problematic is in relation to the investigators appointed 
by the IPCC. These investigators can be, or can have been, serving police officers, 
and this may undermine the perception of independence and thus public confidence in 
the system. The Home Secretary has to approve the arrangements the IPCC makes 
with police forces for secondments of officers. While this may provide a mechanism 
for restricting the numbers of serving police officers in the IPCC, it also raises 
questions about the independence of the system, as the Home Secretary will be able to 
exert “considerable influence over the effective operation of the system” if approval 
for the recruitment of adequate numbers of police investigators is not given (Ormerod 
and Roberts 2003: 153). Having said that, a sufficient number of non-police 
investigators should be recruited, in order to maintain public confidence.  
   Given the problems outlined, why was this system adopted, in preference one based 
on a fully-fledged civilian control model? The reasons appear to be based on cost and 
effectiveness. There was apparently agreement with the government’s view “that it 
would not be practicable or cost-effective” for the IPCC to investigate all complaints 
(Reid 2002: 191; see also KPMG 2000: 44), echoing the Police Complaints 
Authority’s view that “substantial resources” would be needed (PCA 1994: 15) unless 
civilian investigations were reserved for the most serious complaints and conduct 
matters, and those of the highest public interest. This argument ignores the fact that 
external investigation “primarily involves a shift in resources from one agency to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Restorative justice measures and mediation schemes have been shown to have high levels of 
complainant satisfaction (Dobry 2001). 
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another rather than an additional financial cost on government” (Prenzler and Ronken 
2001: 169).8 
   There was also the issue of the need for skilled civilian investigation staff, who 
would “need in-depth training in police procedures and systems”, and who, moreover, 
“might find it more difficult to secure the co-operation of police officers in carrying 
out their investigations” (PCA 1994: 15). There is no evidence to suggest that non-
police personnel cannot acquire the necessary investigation skills. Moreover, 
independent investigations are to be conducted in serious cases, where presumably the 
co-operation of police officers will need to be secured. A strong civilian control 
system can also gain the confidence of the police, as an impartial system will 
vindicate the innocent. 
   The vital question is whether the IPCC will restore public trust and confidence in 
the police after the shortcomings in the complaints process identified by MacPherson 
(1999). It may be that this reform is too little and too late, and the justifications for the 
model adopted in England and Wales begin to look a bit hollow now that it has been 
demonstrated what can be achieved in Northern Ireland by the introduction of a 
system that is modelled on civilian control.   
 
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLICE OMBUDSMAN 
In Northern Ireland, the model adopted for dealing with police complaints involves a 
completely independent system of investigation, truly representative of the civilian 
control model. This is the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI), described 
by the present post-holder as “probably the most advanced model of police oversight 
                                                          
8 It has been estimated that it would cost in the region of £80 million a year to reproduce the Northern 
Ireland model in England and Wales. While this appears a large sum of money, it may be more 
appropriate to consider the cost in terms of a percentage of the overall policing budget. 
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in the world” (O’Loan 2000).9 As the circumstances in Northern Ireland are 
exceptional in terms of policing within the UK, some background to the establishment 
of the present system is needed. 
 
Context 
Before the office of the PONI was established in 2000, police complaints in Northern 
Ireland were dealt by the Independent Commission for Police Complaints, a system 
similar to the Police Complaints Authority. Under that system, officers of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary investigated complaints against fellow officers under the 
direction of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints. Its replacement by 
the PONI followed the review of the system of police complaints (Hayes 1997) and 
the more general review of policing in Northern Ireland (Patten 1999). 
   The Hayes review, conducted by the former Northern Ireland Ombudsman, 
recommended that the Independent Commission for Police Complaints be replaced by 
an independent system based around an ombudsman. The Patten Commission was 
initiated under the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement to investigate future 
policing structures and arrangements for Northern Ireland. Reform of the police 
service emerged as a central plank of the peace process, an essential part of the peace 
dividend (see Ellison and Mulchay 2001: 252). As a result, there were changes to the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland, which 
included equal recruitment across the sectarian divide. A Policing Board replaced the 
Police Authority for Northern Ireland, with responsibilities for setting the policing 
plan, allocating the budget and monitoring performance (Ellison and Mulcahy 2001: 
                                                          
9 In Queensland and New South Wales in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa there are similar 
institutions to that in Northern Ireland, but none is equal in terms of its independence and statutory 
powers (O’Loan 2002: 13). 
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253-254). The Patten report also suggested that a Police Ombudsman would provide 
the key to the effectiveness of the new policing arrangements for Northern Ireland. 
   These new arrangements need to be set in context. Northern Ireland has a 
population of some 1.5 million, and an armed police force of around 13,000. During 
the past 30 years, there has been a total of over 3,300 deaths in the province, around 
300 of which were police officers. Over 43,000 people have been injured, over a fifth 
of these being police officers. The population was deeply split on religious grounds in 
its perception of and support for the police. The work of the PONI has to be seen 
within this scenario. 
   
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland 
The PONI, established by the Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1998, began work in 
October 2000. The stated role of the office is to ensure the efficiency, effectiveness 
and independence of the police complaints system and to secure the confidence of the 
public and members of the police force in the system. The PONI’s remit is the 
investigation of complaints about the conduct of police officers, including allegations 
of criminal conduct. Matters to do with the direction and control of the police are 
outside remit, although these complaints must be analysed and referred to the police. 
The PONI can investigate, informally resolve, or seek mediation of a complaint, and 
is also required to supply statistical information on complaints, and to monitor trends 
and patterns in complaints. The PONI can make recommendations for improving 
practice, and can publish special reports.  
   As noted, the PONI system is based on the civilian control model, and thus, very 
importantly, there is the power to investigate all complaints against the police. The 
PONI has her own investigation staff for conducting investigations, with wide ranging 
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powers. The police can be compelled to supply material to the investigators, and they 
are under a duty to preserve evidence and to facilitate the work of the office. It is a 
criminal offence to restrict, impede or obstruct the PONI’s investigation.  
   As in England and Wales, the PONI cannot prosecute police officers, and where an 
investigation reveals that a criminal offence may have been committed, this is referred 
to the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland. The PONI can however 
make recommendations about disciplinary matters, and has the power to direct that 
disciplinary proceedings be brought. Recommendation for compensation can also be 
made, payment of which does not affect other legal rights a complainant may have.  
   Complaints may be resolved informally, with the complainant’s consent, where 
appropriate. This procedure is used for minor complaints, including allegations of 
failure of duty and incivility, where the conduct alleged, if proved, would not justify 
criminal proceedings. Informal resolution is conducted by the police, but on 
completion the related papers are forwarded to the PONI, in order to ensure that all 
the elements of the complaint have been dealt with, the process has been properly 
handled, and the matter conducted to the satisfaction of the parties involved. 
   The PONI can be accessed directly by or on behalf of any member of the public, by 
letter, email, fax, telephone and personal callers, and the office is accessible 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week. In certain circumstances, the PONI’s staff will visit 
complainants at home or attend at an agreed venue. Where complaints are made 
directly to the police, there is a duty to refer them to the PONI, and the PONI can also 
investigate on her own motion in the absence of a complaint, where a criminal or 
disciplinary offence may have been committed. The PONI must investigate cases of 
death or serious injury.  
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Evaluation 
The most striking aspect of the system for dealing with complaints against the police 
in Northern Ireland is that the process is completely independent of the police. The 
PONI has responsibility both for processing and conducting independent 
investigations, and handles the whole range of complaints, from allegations of police 
incivility to those involving very serious criminal offences. Investigators from the 
PONI’s office collect evidence, visits scenes of crime, and conduct investigations. 
Only minor complaints, which can be resolved informally, are forwarded to the police 
for resolution, and even these remain within the PONI’s control, as the PONI checks 
that the process has been conducted to the satisfaction of the parties involved.  
   Not only is the office independent, but also it is perceived to be so (Hamilton et al 
2003: 12; PONI 2003: PONI 2002), with both communities in Northern Ireland 
generally viewing the PONI in a positive way (Hamilton et al 2003: 7). The 
independence of the system is reinforced by the fact that the PONI has control of the 
process from the initial complaint. All complaints are made directly to the PONI, or 
are referred to the PONI by the police. This accessibility is facilitated by the high 
profile adopted by the office, and the efforts made to publicise its work. Resources are 
important to the effectiveness of the office, as without proper funding the office 
would not be able to carry out its remit, no matter what powers it is given.10  It 
appears that the PONI has been given enough resources to enable it to carry out its 
investigations effectively, with a budget in excess of £6 million a year (PONI 2003: 
75),11 representing about 1% of the policing budget. 
                                                          
10 The South African Independent Complaints Directorate has similar powers to the Police 
Ombudsman, but is less effective because it has a small budget and is understaffed (see Manby 2000: 
218). 
11 In comparison, the Police Complaints Authority had a budget of around £4.5 million, and it has been 
estimated that the budget for the IPCC will be around £14 million.  
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   In the short time since its inception, the PONI has demonstrated its ability to 
conduct thorough investigations, some in very high profile cases.12 The PONI has 
demonstrated that a strong civilian control model can work, and there is growing 
confidence in the system, even within the police service. It is true that the office was 
established in the situation of the unusual policing context of Northern Ireland, and as 
part of the process of bringing peace to that troubled province. Unlike England and 
Wales, it was part of a root and branch change to the policing structure, rather than a 
gradualist, incremental approach.  Despite these special circumstances, the success of 
the office can serve as a model for other jurisdictions.  
 
SCOTLAND 
Scotland has no equivalent body to the IPCC or PONI, complaints being dealt with 
primarily by police forces, although the Scottish Executive is considering proposals to 
reform the existing arrangements (Scottish Executive 2001). Before considering these 
proposals, the existing system in Scotland needs to be examined, together with an 
outline of the context of Scottish policing. 
 
Context 
As in the rest of the UK, Scotland has a tripartite system for the control of the police. 
However, there are some differences, resulting from devolution and changes to local 
government in Scotland, which has effected the governance of the police (see 
Donnelly and Scott 2002a). At the local level, the introduction of single-tier local 
authorities in the 1990s resulted in the creation of local police boards, which are more 
diffuse in their composition than previously. At central government level, policing has 
                                                          
12 For example, the report into the Omagh bombing (see PONI 2001).  
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become a devolved matter, and thus the responsibility of Scottish rather than UK 
ministers. Scotland has a Justice Minister, whose responsibilities include the police, 
and Scottish Ministers approve the appointment of chief constables. The Scottish 
Executive has a number of Parliamentary committees, including two Justice 
Committees, which not only shadow the work of a particular ministerial department, 
but also play a part in initiating legislation, as well as scrutinising it, and conducting 
inquiries into subjects of their own choice. 
   These factors have led to a concern that the Scottish Parliament may “suck up the 
powers of local government itself” in relation to policing matters (McFadden and 
Lazarowicz 1999: 79), and maybe even result in a single national force. Added to this 
is the fact that the roles and responsibilities of police authorities and their respective 
chief constables are not laid out in statute, as they are in England and Wales. All this 
has resulted in some ambivalence about the traditional tripartite system of policing 
and confusion about the respective roles of the Parliament and Executive, the 
Inspectorate, and the audit machinery (see Donnelly and Scott 2002a). The tripartite 
system is thus very different to the one in England and Wales. It is against this 
background that the reform of the police complaints process in Scotland is taking 
place. 
 
Police Complaints in Scotland  
There are a number of bodies with responsibilities in relation to complaints against 
the police in Scotland. Police authorities have responsibilities for monitoring the 
process of complaints, and also for dealing with complaints against chief officers. The 
Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland has to provide an annual report to 
Scottish Ministers on the state and efficiency of the police forces in Scotland, using 
 22
P
st-P
int
inspections of individual police forces as a basis for the report. Part of the inspection 
process involves examining the handling of public complaints against the police (see 
generally Donnelly and Scott 2002b). 
   In the case of allegations of criminal acts against the police, it is important to note 
that there are different prosecution procedures in Scotland to the rest of the UK. 
Responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of crime rests with the Crown, the 
Crown Office, and Procurator Fiscal Service. The latter is headed by the Lord 
Advocate and is independent of the judiciary and the police. Although the police 
normally gather evidence and undertake enquiries on behalf of the procurator fiscal, 
“in practice the Fiscal retains primacy at all times” (HMCICS 2000: 17), and it is even 
possible for investigation and prosecution decisions to be undertaken by the Crown 
with minimal or even no involvement on the part of the police (HMICS 2000: 18). 
Thus, complaints alleging criminal conduct by police officers are investigated by the 
Regional Procurator Fiscal for the relevant force area, on behalf of the Lord 
Advocate. 
   Complaints about police misconduct are investigated by the officer’s force either at 
local level or by the Deputy Chief Constable. Police authorities are responsible for 
dealing with complaints against chief officers. For both criminal and conduct 
complaints, the Regional Procurator Fiscal or police force can request the 
appointment of investigating officers from another force in order to carry out the 
investigation. 
   General oversight of the complaints process is provided by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, which can be requested by a dissatisfied complainant to 
review the way a complaint was handled. After such a review, a report on the findings 
is sent to the complainant, with a copy to the chief constable and the officer who was 
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the subject of the complaint. The Inspectorate cannot investigate any formal action 
taken against the police officer, its function being to examine how the complaint was 
originally investigated. 
 
Reform Proposals 
In 2001, the Scottish Executive published proposals for reform of the system, and 
conducted a consultation process (Scottish Executive 2001). The proposals do not 
envisage any changes to the process of investigation for criminal allegations, which 
will continue as before. For other complaints it is proposed that a new body should be 
established, leaving the police authorities and Inspectorate to their efficiency and 
management roles (Scottish Executive 2001: paras 41, 43). Two systems are 
suggested in the consultation, the first, an “ombudsman”, with a wider role than the 
Inspectorate, but still with an essentially supervisory role, having power to order and 
oversee new investigations, and to conduct random sampling of the complaints 
systems operated by the police (Scottish Executive 2001: para 47). The second is an 
independent complaints body, with responsibility for handling all complaints at first 
instance, with complaints being made directly or referred to it (Scottish Executive 
2001: para 48).  
   Four models are discussed for the new body. In the first, complaints will be referred 
to the police for investigation, with the new body having power to undertake a 
supervisory role in connection with the police investigation. The second model will 
involve less serious complaints being referred to the police; the independent body 
supervising the investigation of more serious cases; and criminal allegations being 
referred to the Regional Procurator Fiscal. The third option is for the new body to 
supervise investigations into all complaints. Finally, the most radical option is for the 
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body to undertake its own investigations into serious or all complaints, using its own 
investigation staff, as in Northern Ireland. 
   There is as yet no indication of which model will be adopted, and there have been 
no further announcements in relation to this review process to date. 
 
Evaluation 
In Scotland, there are no systems of independent investigation comparable to the rest 
of the UK. The system for dealing with criminal allegations is independent of the 
police, but where the complaint does not allege criminal conduct, the police are left to 
investigate the matter themselves. The only independent element in this process is 
provided in the review of the system by the police authorities and Inspectorate. There 
is no independent element in the investigation process itself.  
  Despite the fact that there has been no major crisis in police complaints in Scotland, 
the existing internal system is no longer seen as appropriate, and the proposals for 
reform envisage a more independent model involving some element of civilian input. 
Whether this becomes a civilian review model or a civilian control one remains to be 
seen. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There has been a “growing momentum” for the independent investigation of 
complaints against the police (Smith 2001: 372), and the “legislative tendency” has 
reflected a trend towards this (Smith 2000: 6). To some extent this reflects a general 
trend to external review that is occurring across the professions and public sector,13 
but it is fuelled by various crises in relation to complaints and policing generally. The 
                                                          
13 See Seneviratne (2000) in relation to the legal profession, for example. 
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fact is that it is no longer considered acceptable for complaints to be dealt with by the 
police themselves, and the investigation of police officers by their own or another 
police force “is widely regarded as unjust, and does not inspire public confidence” 
(Macpherson Report 1999: recommendation 58).  
   Public confidence in the police service is essential if there is to be respect for the 
rule of law. The effectiveness of the police service is closely linked with their moral 
authority, and depends to a large extent on community support (Goldsmith 1995: 
120). Moreover, the community has a right to be involved in keeping the coercive arm 
of the state, the police, publicly accountable for its actions. Models of police 
complaints mechanisms, which are controlled entirely by the police with no external 
input, are no longer seen as appropriate, and no longer command public support. 
Civilian oversight bodies that are confined to asking the police questions about a 
police investigation into police misconduct after the investigative process is complete 
are inadequate. 
   Systems for investigating police complaints in the UK have varying degrees of 
external involvement and oversight. Each one can to some extent be characterised in 
terms of Prenzler and Ronkin’s (2001) models. Scotland with little external oversight 
typifies the internal model; England and Wales is still largely based on civilian 
oversight; and it is only in Northern Ireland that there is a system conforming to the 
civilian control model. In Scotland, the proposals for reform do envisage a more 
independent system, although it is not clear what level of civilian oversight will be 
adopted. The Northern Ireland model is the most advanced in terms of external 
oversight, with the PONI, not the police, conducting investigations. The new system 
for England and Wales, while an improvement on its predecessor, has not followed 
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the Northern Ireland model, and the police will still conduct the majority of 
investigations. 
   The system in Northern Ireland is proving to be very effective, which raises the 
issue of why a similar system should not be adopted in England and Wales. The IPCC 
is still very much a compromise model, which may prove to be as unsatisfactory as 
the one it replaces. It is accepted that there were particular needs in the Northern 
Ireland context that had to be addressed, and that the PONI was part of a process of 
reform to the whole policing structure there. However, that is no reason for restricting 
this model to Northern Ireland. The positive lessons that are emerging from Northern 
Ireland present very persuasive reasons for extending the model to other parts of the 
UK. The very success of the PONI model emphasises the inadequacies of other 
systems, and will present a yardstick against which the IPCC and a reformed system 
in Scotland, will be judged, and maybe found wanting. 
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